

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 AF-08

ARA-06 CIAE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-06

SS-15 USIA-06 /121 W

-----050047Z 055607 /63

R 041749Z APR 77

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6416

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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ERDA HQ WASHDC

ERDA GERMANTOWN

SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 2557

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD: CW EXPERTS MEETING, FINAL SESSION

1. SUMMARY: CCD CONCLUDED ITS INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH CW EXPERTS MARCH 31 WITH PRESENTATIONS FY FRG, USSR, AND HUNGARIAN EXPERTS. SOVIET STATEMENT DEALT WITH VARIOUS METHODS OF VERIFICATION. END SUMMARY

2. FOURTH SESSION OF CW EXPERTS MEETING OPENED WITH FRG STATEMENT REJECTING POSSIBILITY OF VERIFICATION OF CW AGENT PRODUCTION BAN THROUGH STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AS ADVOCATED BY SOVIETS. FRG EXPERT (ZEIL) POINTED OUT THAT
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IN THE CASE OF MANY POTENTIAL DUAL-PURPOSE AGENTS, AMOUNT PRODUCED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IS SO LARGE THAT AMOUNT DIVERTED TO MEET ANY CONCEIVABLE MILITARY REQUIREMENT WOULD BE LOST IN NOISE OF NORMAL STATISTICAL ERROR.

3. SOVIET REP (LIKHATCHEV) TOOK EXCEPTION TO US EXPERT'S REMARKS AT EARLIER SESSION (GENEVA 2461) CONCERNING

TREATMENT OF TOXINS IN CW CONVENTION. HE QUOTED ARTICLE I OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND, EXPRESSING SURPRISE THAT US APPARENTLY CONSIDERED THAT CONTROL INEFFECTIVE, QUOTED US STATEMENT ON AUGUST 13, 1976, IN WHICH WE TOOK SOVIETS TO TASK FOR CALLING BWC SCOPE INTO QUESTION IN CONTEXT OF MDW EXERCISE.

HE SAID SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT EXISTING AGREEMENTS OUGHT NOT IN ANY WAY BE WEAKENED BY NEW ONES. (COMMENT: IN FIRST ROUND OF US-USSR CONSULTATIONS ON CW, SOVIET EXPERT INCLUDED TOXINS AMONG AGENTS WHICH WOULD BE COVERED IN CW CONVENTION.)

4. SOVIET EXPERT (SOKOLSKI) DISCUSSED FOUR CLASSES OF VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES WHICH HE CATEGORIZED AS A) LABORATORY, B) REMOTE, C) INDIRECT, AND D) CONSERVATIVE. HE DESCRIBED "LABORATORY" METHODS AS THE COLLECTION OF AIR, WATER AND SOIL SAMPLES FROM PRE-SELECTED SITES AND THEIR ANALYSIS. SOKOLSKI SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH EXCELLENT RESULTS ATTAINABLE, PARTICULARLY WITH USE OF COMPUTERS, DRAWBACKS WERE NEEDED TO KNOW WHERE TO CONDUCT SAMPLING, AND NECESSITY FOR PRESENCE OF SPECIALISTS AT COLLECTION SITE. THUS THIS METHOD NOT SUITABLE FOR INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AND INCAPABLE OF DETECTING CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION. "REMOTE" VERIFICATION, ACCORDING TO SOKOLSKI, INVOLVED THE PLACEMENT OF DETECTION INSTRUMENTS OUTSIDE LIMITS OF SITE TO BE CONTROLLED OR OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL BORDERS OF A STATE. HE SAID ADVANTAGE WAS THAT PRESENCE OF STAFF AND EQUIPMENT ON SITE WAS NOT REQUIRED AND CONTENTED THAT TECHNOLOGY WAS AVAILABLE FOR DETECTION OF SMALL QUANTITIES OF PRACTICALLY CONFIDENTIAL

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ANY SUBSTANCE. SOKOLSKI STATED THAT "REMOTE" METHODS BASED ON THE USE OF OPTICAL SAMPLING EQUIPMENT LOCATED TOGETHER WITH SUITABLE COMPUTERS ON BOARD SATELLITES MIGHT BE ANOTHER METHOD OF NATIONAL VERIFICATION.

5. "INDIRECT" VERIFICATION, ACCORDING TO SOKOLSKI, INVOLVED THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, MEDICAL AND FINANCIAL DATA ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY PREPARED BY SOVIETS AND DESCRIBED IN CCD/403. HE CHARACTERIZED THIS METHOD AS USEFUL FOR THE DETECTION OF CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND, PERHAPS, STOCKPILING AND SUITABLE FOR EITHER NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. "CONSERVATIVE" METHODS OF VERIFICATION, SOKOLSKI SAID, INVOLVED SEALING, TELEMETRIC OBSERVATION AND PERIODIC VISITS TO SITE BEING CONTROLLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SETTING UP AND CHECKING TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. SITES TO BE CONTROLLED WOULD INCLUDE PRODUCTION FACILITIES WHICH HAD BEEN EITHER MOTHBALLED OR CONVERTED TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES, TEST RANGES, STORAGE SITED AND DESTRUCTION FACILITIES. THE DIFFICULTY WITH THE USE OF SUCH AN

INTERNATIONAL METHOD, SOKOLSKI SAID, WAS THAT FOREIGN PERSONNEL WOULD THUS HAVE ACCESS TO COMERCIAL AND MILITARY INFORMATION. THIS COULD LEAD TO PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND DAMAGE TO COMMERCIAL INTEREST. SOKOLSKI CONCLUDED THAT, WHILE ALL FOUR METHODS HE HAD ENUMERATED HADQ CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IN A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL VERIFICATION, THEIR USE IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL WOULD RESULT IN SUCH ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES AS TO RENDER THEIR APPLICATION IMPOSSIBLE.

6. CZECH EXPERT (FRANEK) CHARACTERIZED PARA 1A OF UK DRAFT AS DIFFICULT AND COMPLICATED AND SAID HE NOT SURE UK SUGGESTION THAT HERBICIDES AND DEFOLIANTS COVERED BY ENMOD CONVENTION WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED. SINCE HE TOOK IT THAT UK PERPARED TO SEDD MILITARY USE OF HERBICIDES, DEFOLIANTS, AND RCAS BANNED, HE DID NOT SEE WHY SIMPLER FORMULATION OF COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITION COULD NOT BE WORKED OUT. HUNGARIAN EXPERT (SEBOK) GAVE STATEMENT LARGELY DEVOTED TO QUESTION OF DEFINING AGENTS SUBJECT TO CONFIDENTIAL

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PROHIBITION, STATEING THAT THIS PROBLEM PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IF BAN ONAGENTS NOT COMPREHENSIVE. HE CONSIDERED THAT FOR DEFINITIONAL PURPOSES ONLY TOXICITY CRITERIA NEEDED WOULD BE FOR INHALATION AND SUBCUTANEOUS INJECTION ROUTES. POSSIBLE

VALUES FOR TOXICITY CRITERIA WERE CIETED FOR TREATY COVERING:
(A) SUPERTOXIC AGENTS ONLY; OR (B) ALL LETHAL AGENTS;
OR (C) ALL CW AGENTS, INCLUDING IRRITANTS AND PSYCHOCHEMICALS.

7. IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS, JAPANESE SAID DIFFICULTY ON ENACTING BWC IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION HAD LED THEM TO PROPOSE ANNEXED LIST, ALSO, UK SAID IT WILLING TO CONSIDER BAN ON HERBICIDES, BUT DID NOT BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR CONVENTION AIMED AT PROTECTION OF HUMAN BEINGS. UK RED ADDED THAT SAFE RCAS SHOULD BE PERMITTED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES. NETHERALANDS REP CHARACTERIZED AS ILLOGICAL SOKOLSKI CONTENTION THAT LABORATORY ANALYSIS OF SAMBLES NOT EFFECTIVE WHILE REMOTE MONITORING, WHICH WAS SIMPLY DOING SAME THING AT GREATER DISTANCE, WOULD BE VERY USEFUL.SORENSEN
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Message Attributes

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Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
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To: STATE
Type: TE
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Review Markings:
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